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Abstract
Many fields (social choice, welfare economics, rec-
ommender systems) assume people express what
benefits them via their ‘revealed preferences.’ Re-
vealed preferences have well-documented problems
when used this way, but are hard to displace in
these fields because, as an information source, they
are private, local, verifiable, fine-grained, battle-
tested, and easily-expressed. In order to compete,
other information sources (about participants’ val-
ues, capabilities and functionings, etc) would need
to match this. I present a conception of values
which shares many of these features with revealed
preference.
Introduction
As an information basis for welfare, optimality, so-
cial choice, etc–revealed preference has been much
critiqued. All the same, it’s hard to see how to
move away from it, without paternalism: if people
know best for their own lives, shouldn’t we trust
their choices, and avoid imposing “better values”
from above?
Suppose people do know best, and have wise val-
ues, but that their revealed preferences aren’t the
last word on those values. To establish this, you’d
want another source of information on people’s val-
ues. One that operates at a similar resolution and
reliability.
On Preferences
A rich literature in the social sciences covers how
revealed preferences, summed up into engagement
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metrics, lead us astray.
These problems can be summed up as stemming
from two sources, often intermingled. First, there
can be incompleteness or bias in the option set
framed by the preference. Second, outside pressure
can make the choice less than a complete expression
of the agent’s interests.
Limited or biased options. Alexa buys a car be-
cause there’s no local transit. This counts as a pref-
erence for cars. Ben wants to move to a different
city, but only if his friends also move.1 Ben and his
friends have, unfortunately, revealed a preference
for their current city. Carl and his friends want
to play tennis more—but they’re choosing individ-
ually, from a menu of bookable tennis experiences.
It looks like a preference to play tennis separately—
even a rivalry2 for the same tennis court.
Outside pressure. Dan does something he later
regrets, due to social pressure, misinformation, or a
manipulative ad. Eli is following a social rule which
she knows is not in her best interest.3 Preference!
These problems are not new. In his 1938 paper,
Samuelson warned against using revealed prefer-
ence as a measure of welfare, for presumably these
reasons:
I should like to state my personal opin-
ion that nothing said here… touches upon
at any point the problem of welfare eco-
nomics,except in the sense of revealing
the confusion in the traditional theory of
these distinct subjects.4
1See discussions of the prisoner’s dilemma in e.g., Sen,
“Behaviour and the Concept of Preference”; Anderson, “Sym-
posium on Amartya Sen’s Philosophy.”
2Edelman, “Towards ‘Game B’.”
3See Sen, “Rational Fools”; Anderson, Value in Ethics
and Economics on ‘commitment.’
4Samuelson1938?
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A similar sentiment was put forth by Arrow5 re-
garding social choice, and more recently by Sen,6
Anderson,7 etc.
Why, then, are revealed preferences still fundamen-
tal to our conceptions of benefit, and to measures
of optimality? One reason is their advantages as
an information source. These concern the resolu-
tion and robustness of the data they provide, the
universality of their application:
Resolution:
• Local. Preferences are informed by the local
situations and priorities of user-citizens. Most
alternatives assume outside experts know bet-
ter than user-citizens what would help them.
• Fine-grained. Preferences say subtle things
about how a person wants to live.
Robustness:
• Battle-tested. We often say we want things,
but don’t choose them in the final analysis.
Preferences get at our real priorities.
• Private. Preferences are often expressed away
from the signaling of allegiances, so they’re less
influenced by social pressure.
• Verifiable. Engagements leave a trail. Who
did you actually vote for? What did you pur-
chase?
And universality:
• Easily-expressed. You don’t need to be par-
ticularly introspective or good with words to
act on a gut feeling about what’s right for you.
• Comprehensive. Preferences do not limit
us to one domain of life—the moral, the
self-interested, etc, but represent all-things-
considered judgements, and apply to many
kinds of choices.
Attentional Policies
A revealed preference considers the options as given.
As other authors have pointed out,8 this doesn’t
fully reflect how choice works.
5Social Choice and Individual Values.
6“Rational Fools.”
7“Symposium on Amartya Sen’s Philosophy.”
8Smaldino and Richerson, “The Origins of Options.”
What would preference look like, if it were ab-
stracted away from a (possibly biased or incom-
plete) set of options?
Consider my choice, with colleagues, to say some-
thing witty. At 𝑡 = 1, I choose to say that in par-
ticular, over doing or saying whatever else I might
have in mind. But, at some earlier point 𝑡 = 0, I de-
cided to invest my attention in finding witty things
to say. I try witty phrases on in my mind; I test sit-
uations for witty reframings. My attentional policy
of ‘looking for witty quips and reframes,’ adopted
at 𝑡 = 0, is how I assemble the option set for my
choice at 𝑡 = 1.
If we conceive of agents as having these atten-
tional policies9 (APs), how would they be re-
vealed?
They could be revealed directly: to find out if some-
one has an AP 𝑎 in context 𝑐, you can put them
in 𝑐 and see what they attend to. Slightly less di-
rectly, you can see what options they find. Or, you
can test for detailed knowledge of when exactly it
makes sense for them to follow 𝑎. If they really
have 𝑎, they are likely to know the shape of 𝑐 well.
1. Fine-grained. To guide our attention, APs
must be precise. “Be honest” is too vague—it
doesn’t tell me what to look for. So, a pol-
icy like “be honest” is short for a more specific
articulation, like “attend to what I feel about
each thing we discuss, and let my feeling show,”
or “attend to any false impressions the listener
might get from my statements, and head them
off with a disclaimer.” To have honesty as a
policy, I must first have a substantive inter-
pretation of honesty.
9By policy, I mean something like “taking out the trash
when it’s almost full,” “calling mom on Sundays,” or “run-
ning new contracts past the lawyer”—something done regu-
larly, or in a certain context, without a cost-benefit analysis
each time. Attentional policies. then, are policies about how
to think about a thing, what to pay attention to in a context,
or what to look for in selecting an action. APs are necessary
due to bounded rationality and social coordination, just like
plans, heuristics, norms, intentions, etc. (Bratman, Inten-
tion, Plans, and Practical Reason; Simon, “A Behavioral
Model of Rational Choice”; Taylor, The Language Animal)
They also offer another account for the rationality of collec-
tive action—compared to the prisoner’s dilemma arguments
in Anderson, “Symposium on Amartya Sen’s Philosophy”
and Sen, “Behaviour and the Concept of Preference”. My
approach follows Velleman, Self to Self, ch 11, closely.
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2. Local. These substantive interpretations dif-
fer from person to person. APs might ac-
count for much of what’s called “personal-
ity”: When making friends, are you cautious
or bold? When considering a purchase, is the
focus on price, quality, or durability? When
speaking, do you try to be witty, precise, or
down to earth? Often these aren’t just “char-
acter traits” a person is born with, but policies
adopted for a reason, which work together for
that person’s way of life.10
3. Hard-boiled. Talking to colleagues at work,
I might like to craft my words to be kind, hon-
est, tactful, humble, and inspiring. I might
try to be precise in my speech, aware of how
each word lands, aware of my own feelings, and
transparent with them. Calm and centered,
but also passionate. Physically graceful, like a
dancer.
This is impossible, since policies compete for
my attention. So, choosing to look for witty
things to say means I’m not looking for vulner-
able things to say, or helpful things, or myste-
rious things, etc. That’s, more or less, a choice
not to be vulnerable, helpful, or mysterious!11
Justification Shapes
Attentional policies may amerliorate some prob-
lems with baised or incomplete option sets. What
about problems due to outside pressure? For in-
stance, consider this AP:
I’m careful with my speech at work. My
boss fires anyone who speaks imprecisely.
Consider an idealized agent who operates as above:
adopting attentional policies ahead of time, and
using them to produce options for most choices.
Presume also that this agent engages in something
like practical reasoning about which APs to adopt,
weighing reasons why one policy might be more ben-
eficial than another in a context. (Here reasons are
10This characterization of an identity as composed of APs
shares something with Anderson, “Symposium on Amartya
Sen’s Philosophy”; and Velleman, Practical Reflection.
11At least, at work. I have an idea when to try for witti-
ness: maybe at work, but not in a fight with my wife.
of the form highlighted by,12 Velleman,13 etc. Such
an agent can be characterized as having a set of re-
current contexts in their life, for each of which an
AP has been adopted, for a set of reasons.
Further posit that in some cases, these reasons
build on and dependend on each other. For in-
stance, as axioms depend on one another in making
a theory, or as in steps coming together to make
plan. In other cases, reasons are diffuse and inde-
pendent.
In the example above, speaking carefully is justified
by a chain of hypotheses about the consequences.
I must speak carefully, or I’ll say things my boss
doesn’t like; then, I’ll get fired. We can visualize
these reasons as a chain X⟶Y⟶Z.
Contrast that with these:
I recently opened up to a friend about a
struggle of mine. Since then, the relation-
ship feels more intimate, and stronger; it’s
easier for me to think about what to say;
my friend is unexpectedly helpful. Now,
I can’t imagine a good life that doesn’t
include being honest with friends.
Here, honesty leads to many benefits, not chained
together. We can visualize these reasons (which
point in many directions) as a star ⋆.
When reasons for a policy form a chain ⟶, I’ll say
it’s narrow-justified, or adopted for narrow-benefits.
When the reasons are a star ⋆, I’ll say broad-justified
or broad-benefits.
I’ll only call something broad-justified if it’s
adopted for bountiful, redundant, and untracked rea-
sons. By bountiful, I mean I haven’t listed them all.
I’ve only started listing benefits of honesty and ex-
pect to discover new ones. By redundant, I mean
I’d continue being honest if any one benefit (such
as “my friend is unexpectedly helpful”) turned out
mistaken. By untracked I mean that, when being
honest, I’m not tracking whether the benefits I’ve




14This argument descends from Boyd, “How to Be a Moral
Realist.”
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In the intro, I mentioned two kinds of “values”15:
social visions and meaning nuggets. Here’s a social
vision:
Social visions. Sometimes people mean visions of
what’s right for everyone, or for a group—what a
family should be like, how a father should behave,
what a nation should be like, etc. On this defini-
tion, values would include things like inclusiveness,
freedom, feminine dress-codes, etc.
Meaning nuggets. Other times, people mean
things that feel right and meaningful when you do
them—such as being vulnerable, taking stage, being
creative, etc.
If you want meaning nuggets, without social vi-
sions16, select only BAPs.
Andrew believes a pervasive dishonesty
is undermining democracy and civil soci-
ety. For this reason, he tries to spread
honesty—denouncing lies, and setting an
example of honesty wherever he goes.
Andrew thinks honesty will save democracy, and
that he should spread it by being honest himself.
This is a chain of hypotheses ⟶. In general, social
visions create narrow-justified APs (NAPs), not
broad-justified ones (BAPs).
Figure 1: Examples of broad-justified APs, from our
database, meaning.supplies.
15Values are often considered as evaluative criteria or at-
titudes (Chang, “‘All Things Considered’”, Velleman, Prac-
tical Reflection). Here, I treat them as policies, but I think
these definitions are interchangeable. An evaluative attitude
or criterion can be viewed as something a person does when
making an evaluation or choice.
16Social visions often feel meaningful, but only because
they ride on a companion BAP. E.g., my social vision
of spreading values-articulacy rides on a BAP: responding
deeply to the world-situation as I find it. To verify that the
meaning comes from the BAP, I can check for vison-but-not-
BAP meaningless times, and vice versa.
Selecting only BAPs will also filter out other
things—what’s done just to keep our jobs, fit in
with a friend group, achieve specific goals, or get
good sensations—what other philosophers call in-
strumental goods.17
Wisdom and Meaning
Questions of welfare are intimately wrapped up in
the deeper questions of what it is we should hold as
good and honorable in human life. I cannot tackle
these questions here, but I want to convey an intu-
ition about why a person’s BAPs might reasonably
be worth honoring, at least as much as their pref-
erences, goals, feelings, opinions, and the like.
I’ll capture this intuition in a story about the life-
cycle of a BAP.
𝑡 = 1. Brenda sips her morning tea,
watching a bird on the feeder. Something
shifts in her; she sees the bird shares a
great project with her. She and the bird
are explorers and representatives of what
it is to be alive.
𝑡 = 2. Over time, thinking of her-
self as “an explorer of what it is to be
alive” becomes a new kind of curiosity for
Brenda. It comes up when she “does an-
imal things” (in the woods, overcome by
emotion, plunging into cold water). She
notices more about her environment, and
about how she feels.
𝑡 = 3. Brenda’s become more explorative
and bolder. Her attention shifts: when in
nature, etc, she no longer focuses on being
an explorer, but on balancing exploration
with other factors, like self-care. Being
“an explorer of what it is to be alive” is
still, in a sense, something she does. It’s
still important to her. But it’s become
automatic.
At 𝑡 = 1, Brenda might say her bird-moment is a
17Or: what’s broad-justified constitutes the good life;
what’s narrow-justified is done to reach the good life, from
a position outside it. This makes some geometric sense, if
reasons are steps in a topological space. In any case, I hope
broad vs narrow is more defensible than intrinsic vs instru-
mental.
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new idea about something broadly-beneficial. But
she doesn’t see how to repeat it, or further explore
it.
At 𝑡 = 2, Brenda has a new BAP. She probably
doesn’t have a phrase for it, like “being an explorer
of what it is to be alive.”
My intuition that BAPs are worth honoring is
based on the familiarity of this story. Experiences
like Brenda’s are precisely those we call meaning-
ful18. And we often feel like those experiences (or
their distilltion into policies that comes after them)
amount to a gain in wisdom19.
Broad justifications are harder to communicate—
they’re made of many data points, usually collected
via experience living a certain way. That’s why
“life wisdom” mostly comes from experience. No
matter how dog-eared your Kahlil Gibran book is,
you haven’t collected all those diffuse benefits.
Figure 2: This chart shows how we often refer to stories
like Brenda’s
18At 𝑡 = 3, “greeting the world as an explorer of what it
is to be alive” has ceased to be meaningful. It may become
meaningful again, if she loses her way—for instance, if she
gets too busy with work, or loses touch with her curiosity.
19Knowledge towards narrow benefit is know-how; well-
informed broad justifications are wisdom. I.e., wisdom could
be defined as “knowing from experience which policies are
broadly beneficial.” Meaning is the frontier of wisdom—the
part we still need attention for. Or just: Meaning, the
first derivative of a wise, good life.
Conclusion
That relevance to “meaning” and “wisdom” is one
reason to augment preference information with
BAP-information in the calculations of social choice
and welfare.
Concretely, we can use BAPs to augment or replace
preference information, by asking people what they
attend to in various contexts20, and filtering out the
NAPs.
Then, instead of asking if users engage with a prod-
uct, designers can ask if it makes space for them to
be vulnerable, to be “explorers of what it is to be
alive,” or whatever their BAPs are.
Although this gets collected individually21, it seems
likely that BAPs will reduce problems of atom-
ization. They capture what sort of social life in-
dividuals find meaningful—information often miss-
ing from preferences due to coordination problems.
And BAPs contain wisdom, also often lost in pref-
erence, about the smooth operation of social life.
For instance, a scientist’s BAPs might include in-
tellectual humility, passionate pursuit of the truth,
etc. These aren’t just meaningful for scientists,
they keep the institution of science on the rails.
Diverse problems stem from engagement-
maximizing systems. Depression, media clickbait,
isolation of the elderly, obesity, over-consumption,
political polarization, bullshit jobs—all stem from
a gap between preference and what people find
meaningful and wise.
But to close this gap will require further explo-
ration:
1. One next step is to explore BAPs empirically.
Are they more or less stable than preferences?
How often are they regretted? How indepen-
dent are they from social pressure, framing ef-
fects, or the specifics of survey language?
2. BAPs are not so easily-expressed as prefer-
ences. Can interfaces for assisted introspec-
tion bring the articulacy requirements of BAPs
20E.g., what do they attend to while socializing? Is it how
much space they give the people around them? Is it saying
things carefully, so that their friends aren’t upset?
21And thus leave some problems with preference-based
measures unsolved—such as agnosticism about distribution,
and difficulty with interpersonal comparison.
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closer to those of preferences? Can BAPs be
inferred from other data? Can such data col-
lection mechanisms be made robust22?
3. A final step will be to make social choice
mechanisms that augment preferences with
BAP-information. For instance, by taxing
BAP-negative outcomes, or subsidizing BAP-
positive ones.
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